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Recent neuroimaging research has revealed that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is 
consistently engaged when people form mental representations of themselves. However, the 
precise function of this region in self-representation is not yet fully understood. Here, we 
investigate whether the MPFC contributes to epistemic and emotive investments in self-
views, which are essential components of the self-concept that stabilize self-views and shape 
how one feels about oneself. Using fMRI, we show that the level of activity in the MPFC 
when people think about their personal traits (by judging trait adjectives for self-
descriptiveness) depends on their investments in the particular self-view under consideration, 
as assessed by post-scan rating scales. Furthermore, different forms of investments are 
associated with partly distinct medial prefrontal areas: a region of the dorsal MPFC is 
uniquely related to the degree of certainty with which a particular self-view is held (one‟s 
epistemic investment), whereas a region of the ventral MPFC responds specifically to the 
importance attached to this self-view (one‟s emotive investment). These findings provide new 
insight into the role of the MPFC in self-representation and suggest that the ventral MPFC 
confers degrees of value upon the particular conception of the self that people construct at a 
given moment. 
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The ability to form mental representations of the self is a central, perhaps distinguishing, 
feature of the human mind. Certain other species—and even some robots (Bongard et al. 
2006)—possess rudimentary self-models that allow them to distinguish themselves from their 
environment, but there is no certainty that they think about themselves in abstract and 
symbolic ways as humans routinely do (Sedikides and Skowronski 1997; Leary and 
Buttermore 2003). We possess many different ideas and beliefs about who we are and what 
we are like—our traits, abilities, preferences, and goals—and how we feel and behave is 
strongly influenced by these self-conceptions, for better and worse (Leary 2004).  
Substantial progress has recently been made in understanding how self-conceptions 
are represented and processed in the human brain. Neuroimaging studies have revealed that 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and other cortical midline structures (CMS) are 
consistently engaged when people think about their own personal characteristics, such as their 
traits (e.g. Johnson et al. 2002; Kelley et al. 2002; Lieberman et al. 2004; D'Argembeau et al. 
2005; Moran et al. 2006) and goals (e.g. Johnson et al. 2006; Packer and Cunningham 2009; 
D'Argembeau et al. 2010a). A recent review (Lieberman 2010) indicates that the ventral 
portion of the MPFC
1
 is most frequently involved (94% of studies), followed by the posterior 
cingulate cortex/precuneus (63% of studies) and dorsal MPFC (53% of studies) (see also the 
meta-analyses of Northoff et al. 2006; Van Overwalle 2009; van der Meer et al. 2010). These 
findings demonstrate that CMS somehow contribute to self-representation, but the precise 
function of these regions remains unclear and debated (for different perspectives, see Northoff 
and Bermpohl 2004; Schmitz and Johnson 2007; Legrand and Ruby 2009; Mitchell 2009; 
D'Argembeau and Salmon in press). 
                                                          
1
 The designation of different portions of MPFC varies somewhat across authors. In this article, the term ventral 
MPFC is used to describe a large portion of the medial prefrontal cortex that includes parts of the medial area 10, 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex (z coordinate ≤ 10 mm), whereas the term dorsal MPFC 
is used to refer to the higher portion of the medial prefrontal cortex (z coordinate > 10 mm). 
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Thinking about the self involves more than the dispassionate contemplation of one‟s 
personal attributes. As William James put it more than a century ago, “the altogether unique 
kind of interest which each human mind feels in those parts of creation which it can call me or 
mine may be a moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological fact” (James 1890, p. 289). 
The interest and affective value we place on our conceptions of ourselves is an essential 
constituent of the self-concept that stabilizes self-views and shapes how we feel about 
ourselves (Pelham 1991). Interestingly, the brain region that is most consistently recruited 
when people think about themselves―the ventral MPFC―is also well-known for its role in 
emotion (Phan et al. 2002; Schaefer et al. 2003) and valuation processes (Wallis 2007; Peters 
and Buchel 2010; Rangel and Hare 2010). Notably, there is evidence that activity in the 
ventral MPFC tracks the subjective value of various kinds of stimuli, including food, 
monetary rewards, and attractive faces (O'Doherty et al. 2003; Kable and Glimcher 2007; 
Chib et al. 2009; Hare et al. 2009), and some studies have shown that the degree of self-
relatedness assigned to the stimuli correlates with activity in value-related regions, including 
the ventral MPFC (Phan et al. 2004; de Greck et al. 2008). Together, these findings suggest 
that the ventral MPFC represents the personal value of information from diverse sources, 
ranging from primary rewards to complex social information (Montague et al. 2006; Peters 
and Buchel 2010). Although these studies focused on the subjective value assigned to external 
environmental stimuli, the ventral MPFC could play a similar putative role for mental 
representations of the self (e.g., people‟s beliefs about their personal traits). An intriguing 
possibility is thus that activity in the ventral MPFC when people think about themselves 
represents the value they attach to the particular self-conception that is displayed in their 
minds at a given moment.  
Here, we specifically set out to test this hypothesis by investigating the neural 
correlates of people‟s investments in their self-views. Furthermore, we sought to examine 
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whether different forms of investment in self-views are supported by dissociable brain 
regions. Research has revealed that people possess at least two different forms of investment 
in their self-conceptions: they can place more or less importance and value on particular self-
views, and can hold these self-views with more or less confidence (Pelham 1991).These two 
forms of investment—referred to as emotive and epistemic—involve distinct processes: the 
extent to which a self-view is valued and considered important (emotive investment) is related 
to one‟s personal goals and motives, whereas the degree of certainty with which a self-view is 
held (epistemic investment) depends on the amount and consistency of information one has 
about this aspect of the self (Pelham 1991). For example, someone might be certain that she is 
generally punctual (high epistemic investment), yet consider that punctuality is not a 
particularly important trait for her to possess (low emotive investment). On the other hand, 
this person might invest much importance in being attractive (high emotive investment) but 
might still feel uncertain about whether or not she truly possesses this attribute (low epistemic 
investment).  
Although the neural substrates of epistemic and emotive investments in self-views 
have not yet been investigated, there are reasons to suspect that they may involve at least 
partly distinct brain areas. There is substantial functional specialization within the MPFC 
(Gilbert et al. 2006) and valuation processes primarily engage the ventral portion of MPFC 
(Wallis 2007; Peters and Buchel 2010; Rangel and Hare 2010). We thus expected that the 
ventral MPFC would mainly encode emotive investments in self-views. The dorsal MPFC, on 
the other hand, has been related to cognitive aspects of self-referential processing (e.g., 
introspective or evaluation processes) (Gusnard et al. 2001; Northoff and Bermpohl 2004; 




We thus hypothesized that (1) activity in the MPFC when people think about their 
personal characteristics would track their investments in self-views and (2) at least partly 
distinct portions of MPFC (ventral versus dorsal) would be associated with emotive and 
epistemic investments in self-views. To test these hypotheses, we measured blood 
oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signals using whole brain fMRI while participants rated 
the self-descriptiveness of a series of trait adjectives (e.g., sincere, lazy, punctual). In line with 
previous research (Moran et al. 2006), we expected that activity in CMS would show a linear 
relationship with ratings of self-descriptiveness. More importantly for our purpose, we also 
obtained estimates of participants‟ epistemic and emotive investments in self-views by having 
them rate, immediately after scanning, their degree of certainty in each self-view and the 
importance they attach to each self-view. We then correlated participants‟ BOLD signal 
obtained during the self-descriptiveness judgments with their own subsequent evaluations of 
certainty and importance, which allowed us to identify the brain regions that responded to 
epistemic and emotive investments in self-views on a trial-by-trial basis.  
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Participants were 23 healthy, right-handed young adults (12 women; mean age = 21.5 years, 
range = 18-25), with no history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. They all gave their 
written informed consent to take part in the study, which was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Medical School of the University of Liège.  
 
Task 
During scanning, participants judged the self-descriptiveness of 240 trait adjectives selected 
from a published database (Anderson 1968) and translated into French (Le Barbenchon et al. 
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2005). The stimuli encompassed a wide range of social desirability values (range = 1.44-6.31, 
on a 7-point rating scale; M = 4.01, SD = 1.38). The 240 adjectives and 60 null events 
consisting of a fixation cross were presented in random order for 3500 msec, followed by a 
fixation cross of variable duration (random normal distribution with a mean duration of 1000 
msec and standard deviation of 250 msec). Participants were instructed to rate each trait for 
self-descriptiveness (i.e., “to what extent does this trait describe you?”), using a Likert-type 4-
point rating scale (pressing button 1 for “not at all,” to button 4 for “completely”). Before the 
scanning session participants went through a series of practice trials (with a different set of 
adjectives) in order to familiarize them with the task.  
Immediately after the scanning session, participants were presented with the same set 
of 240 trait adjectives and were instructed to make three kinds of judgments for each trait: (1) 
self-descriptiveness (i.e., “to what extent does this trait describe you?”; 1 = not at all, 4 
=completely), (2) certainty in the self-view (i.e., “how certain are you that you possess or do 
not possess this trait?”; 1 = not at all, 4 = completely), and (3) importance of the self-view 
(i.e., “how important is it for you to possess or not possess this trait?”; 1 = not at all 
important, 4 = very important).
2
 The three kinds of judgments were self-paced, and 
participants were encouraged to use the four response possibilities in order to refine their 
judgments.  
 
                                                          
2
 It is worth mentioning that the constructs of epistemic and emotive investments in self-views are distinct from 
the cognitive and affective components of self as defined by Moran et al. (2006). The cognitive component of 
self in Moran et al. referred to the brain areas that responded to degrees of self-descriptiveness (a dimension that 
is simply referred to here as self-descriptiveness). The affective component of self referred to brain areas that 
were more active for positive compared to negative traits that were judged self-descriptive. On the other hand, 
the construct of emotive investment that is investigated here refers to the importance/value attached to a self-
view, whatever the valence of the trait under consideration. In the present sample, the average correlation 
between ratings of importance and the normative values for trait valence was .09 (i.e., they shared less than 1% 
of their variance).  
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fMRI data acquisition 
Functional MRI time series were acquired on a 3T head-only scanner (Magnetom Allegra, 
Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) operated with the standard transmit-receive 
quadrature head coil. Multislice T2*-weighted functional images were acquired with a 
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence using axial slice orientation and covering 
the whole brain (34 slices, FoV = 192x192 mm², voxel size 3x3x3 mm³, 25% interslice gap, 
matrix size 64x64x34, TR = 2040 ms, TE = 30 ms, FA = 90°). Six hundred and seventy 
functional volumes were acquired, and the first three volumes were discarded to avoid T1 
saturation effects. A gradient-recalled sequence was applied to acquire two complex images 
with different echo times (TE = 4.92 and 7.38 ms respectively; TR = 367 ms, FoV = 
230x230 mm
2
, 64x64 matrix, 34 transverse slices with 3 mm thickness and 25% interslice 
gap, FA = 90°, bandwidth = 260 Hz/pixel) and generate field maps for distortion correction of 
EPI data. A structural MR scan was obtained at the end of the session (T1-weighted 3D MP-
RAGE sequence, TR = 1960 ms, TE = 4.4 ms, FoV 230 x 173 mm², matrix size 256 X 192 X 
176, voxel size 0.9 X 0.9 X 0.9 mm³). Head movement was minimized by restraining the 
subject‟s head using a vacuum cushion. Stimuli were displayed on a screen positioned at the 
rear of the scanner, which the participant could comfortably see through a mirror mounted on 
the standard head coil. 
 
fMRI data analyses 
fMRI data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging 
Neuroscience, http//www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc., 
Sherborn, MA). EPI time series were corrected for motion and distortion using Realign and 
Unwarp (Andersson et al. 2001) together with the Fieldmap Toolbox (Hutton et al. 2002) in 
SPM8. The high-resolution T1 image was then coregistered to the functional images and 
9 
 
segmented into gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid. Functional images were 
spatially normalized to MNI space (voxel size: 2 X 2 X 2 mm³) using the normalization 
parameters obtained from the segmentation procedure, and subsequently smoothed with a 
Gaussian kernel with full-width at half maximum of 8 mm. 
Data were analyzed using the general linear model (GLM) as implemented in SPM8. 
First, we sought to replicate previous research demonstrating that activity in CMS shows a 
linear relationship with ratings of self-descriptiveness (Moran et al. 2006). To do so, we 
estimated a GLM that included a regressor for the presentation of the stimuli, a parametric 
regressor (the participant‟s ratings for self-descriptiveness), and the realignment parameters to 
account for any residual movement-related effect. Next, our main interest was to identify the 
brain areas that responded to epistemic and emotive investments in self-views. To do so, we 
estimated a GLM that included a regressor for the presentation of the stimuli, two parametric 
regressors (the participant‟s ratings for certainty and importance of self-views), and the 
realignment parameters. The two parametric regressors were entered simultaneously in the 
GLM because there was a small positive correlation between ratings of certainty and 
importance (see the „Behavioral results‟ section) and we wanted to examine the effect of one 
dimension after the effect of the other dimension had been accounted for. The canonical 
heamodynamic response function was used and a high pass filter was implemented using a 
cut-off period of 128 s in order to remove the low-frequency drifts from the time series. Serial 
autocorrelations were estimated with a restricted maximum likelihood algorithm with an 
autoregressive model of order 1 (+ white noise). Contrast images coding for each parametric 
regressor were constructed for each participant and were then entered into second-level 
random-effects analyses using one-sample t-tests.  
For all analyses, statistical inferences were corrected for multiple comparisons using 
Gaussian random field theory at the voxel level in a small spherical volume (radius, 10 mm) 
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around a priori locations of structures of interest, taken from the literature on self-referential 
processing. These a priori regions of interest mainly concerned CMS areas, specifically the 
ventral MPFC (-6, 54, -2; 10, 52, 2) (Kelley et al. 2002; D'Argembeau et al. 2008), dorsal 
MPFC (-2, 56, 26; 10, 44, 24) (D'Argembeau et al. 2007, 2008), and posterior cingulate cortex 
(-2, -58, 26) (D'Argembeau et al. 2008). Other brain regions that have been associated with 
self-referential processing (though less consistently across studies) were also considered, 
including the inferior parietal lobe (-44, -66, 32; 46, -68, 40; 44, -54, 38) (Lou et al. 2004; 
D'Argembeau et al. 2010b), lateral temporal cortex (-62, -10, -12; 68, -10, -20) (Benoit et al. 
2010; Rameson et al. 2010), insula (-36, 20, 4; 44, -10, 14) (Tsakiris et al. 2007; Modinos et 
al. 2009), and caudate nucleus (-12, 10, 12) (Enzi et al. 2009). For completeness, all brain 
regions outside a priori areas of interest that survived a threshold of p < .001 (uncorrected for 
multiple comparisons) with at least 30 contiguous voxels (i.e., a volume of 240 mm
3
) are 




Due to a defect in the MRI-compatible response box, the response times for the self-
descriptiveness judgments made during scanning were not recorded for four participants. For 
the remaining 19 participants, a repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the 
median response times revealed that the speed of participants‟ responses differed as a function 
of self-descriptiveness ratings, F(3, 54) = 29.28, p < .001 (Figure 1). In line with previous 
findings (Moran et al. 2006), response times were shorter when a trait was self-descriptive or 
not self-descriptive (i.e., ratings of 1 and 4) compared to the graded responses (i.e., ratings of 
2 and 3), F(1, 18) = 33.42, p < .001.  
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The response times for self-descriptiveness judgments were also influenced by 
epistemic and emotive investments in self-views, as measured by the post-scan ratings of 
certainty and importance. As shown in Figure 1, response times for self-descriptiveness 
judgments decreased with increasing certainty in self-views, F(3, 54) = 17.29, p < .001. In the 
same vein, response times decreased with increasing importance of self-views, F(3, 54) = 
15.30, p < .001 (Figure 1). Thus, although participants did not explicitly reflect on epistemic 
and emotive investments in self-views during scanning, their investments can be objectified in 
terms of their influence on the speed of self-descriptiveness judgments. These data provide 
support for the validity of our measures of investments in self-views.  
In line with previous findings (Pelham 1991), there was a positive correlation between 
ratings of certainty and ratings of importance. However, this correlation was rather small: the 
average correlation was .26 (which is comparable to the average correlation reported by 
Pelham 1991), meaning that the two forms of investments shared only about 7% of their 
variance in this sample. 
 
fMRI results 
We first investigated the brain regions in which neural activity was correlated with ratings of 
self-descriptiveness. In line with previous observations (Moran et al. 2006), self-
descriptiveness was positively correlated with activity in several CMS, including the ventral 
MPFC, dorsal MPFC, and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Figure 2, Table 1). Figure 2 
shows that the signal change in the peak voxel in the MPFC (which was located in the ventral 
MPFC; see Table 1) took the form of deactivations relative to baseline (with less decreases in 
activity as a function of increasing self-descriptiveness), which also replicates previous 
findings (Moran et al. 2006). A positive correlation with self-descriptiveness was also 
detected in the left inferior parietal lobe, right insula, and left caudate (Table 1).  
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Having replicated previous findings that CMS activity correlates with self-
descriptiveness, our main interest was then to identify the brain areas that responded to 
epistemic and emotive investments in self-views. To do so, we correlated participants‟ BOLD 
signal obtained while they performed the self-descriptiveness judgments with their own 
subsequent evaluations of the certainty and importance of each self-view. In accord with our 
prediction that neural activity in the MPFC would track participants‟ investments in their self-
views, we found that ratings of personal importance were positively correlated with activity in 
a region of the ventral MPFC and a region of the dorsal MPFC; a positive correlation was also 
detected in the PCC/precuneus, inferior parietal lobe, and right insula (Table 2). Ratings of 
certainty were also positively correlated with neural activity in the MPFC, in both ventral and 
dorsal regions; a positive correlation was also detected in the PCC, inferior parietal lobe, and 
lateral temporal cortex (Table 2).  
To allow the visual comparison of medial prefrontal areas responding to the 
importance of self-views with those responding to certainty, Figure 3 displays simultaneously 
the activation maps corresponding to each dimension. As can be seen, the two maps 
overlapped in a small region of the ventral MPFC. However, Figure 3 shows that certainty 
and importance were also associated with distinct medial prefrontal areas. Notably, certainty 
was associated with more extensive activation in the dorsal MPFC, whereas importance was 
associated with more extensive activation in the ventral MPFC.  
To formally investigate the brain regions that were specifically related to each form of 
investment in self-views, we performed exclusive masking analyses. The contrast images 
coding for one dimension were exclusively masked by the contrast images coding for the 
other dimension, and the exclusive masks were thresholded using a liberal significance level 
(p < .05, uncorrected) in order to increase the confidence with which it can be concluded that 
the resulting brain activations are specific to each type of investment. These analyses revealed 
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a region of the dorsal MPFC that responded specifically to the certainty of self-views and a 
region of the ventral MPFC that responded specifically to the importance of self-views 
(Figure 4, Table 3). As can be seen in Figure 4, the signal change in the ventral MPFC took 
the form of deactivations relative to resting baseline, whereas the dorsal MPFC showed signal 
increases relative to baseline. The exclusive masking analyses also revealed a region of the 
left lateral temporal cortex that responded specifically to certainty, whereas a region of the 
right posterior insula and a region of the right inferior parietal lobe responded specifically to 
importance (Table 3). 
Finally, we performed an inclusive masking analysis to formally investigate the brain 
areas that were associated with both forms of investments in self-views (the inclusive mask 
was thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected). This analysis revealed that a region of the ventral 
MPFC (MNI coordinates: -2 50 -2, Z = 4.18, pSVC= .002), the PCC (MNI coordinates: 0 -54 
34, Z = 3.40, pSVC = .027), and the left inferior parietal lobe (MNI coordinates: -50 -62 38, Z = 
4.99, pSVC < .001) responded to both epistemic and emotive investments in self-views. 
 
Discussion 
The value we attach to particular conceptions of ourselves is an important constituent 
of our self-concept that stabilizes self-views and shapes how we feel about ourselves (James 
1890; Pelham 1991). This study provides new evidence for the role of the MPFC in this 
valuation process. The results demonstrate that the level of activity in the MPFC when people 
think about their personal traits depends on their investments in the particular self-view under 
consideration. Furthermore, we show that two different forms of investment in self-
views―epistemic and emotive―are associated with partly distinct medial prefrontal areas: a 
region of the dorsal MPFC is uniquely related to the degree of certainty with which a 
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particular self-view is held, whereas a region of the ventral MPFC responds specifically to the 
importance attached to this self-view. 
There is growing evidence that activity in the ventral MPFC tracks the subjective 
value of different kinds of stimuli from the external environment, such as food, monetary 
rewards, and social information (O'Doherty et al. 2003; Kable and Glimcher 2007; de Greck 
et al. 2008; Chib et al. 2009; Hare et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010). The current study add to 
these findings by showing that neural activity in a region of the ventral MPFC correlates with 
the importance/value people assign to their conceptions of themselves. This region is similar 
to the regions reported in several previous studies of valuation (e.g. Chib et al. 2009; Smith et 
al. 2010), which suggests the intriguing possibility that the same subjective valuation 
mechanisms could be applied to external stimuli from the environment and internally 
generated representations of the self. It should be noted, however, that there is some 
heterogeneity in the precise location of activation peaks across studies (Peters and Buchel 
2010) and that the value of different kinds of information could be represented by distinct 
neurons in the ventral MPFC, which cannot be easily detected with fMRI due to its limited 
spatial resolution (Grabenhorst and Rolls 2011).  
Be that as it may, the present results provide new insight into the role of the ventral 
MPFC in self-representation. It is noteworthy that participants in this study did not explicitly 
reflect on the importance they attach to their self-views during scanning, such that the 
observed activity in the ventral MPFC is unlikely to represent the engagement of explicit 
evaluation processes (see also Moran et al. 2009; Rameson et al. 2010, for recent evidence 
that the ventral MPFC increases its activity in response to self-relevant information in the 
absence of explicit self-referential judgments). Instead, the ventral MPFC might automatically 
confer degrees of value to the conceptions of the self that people form in their minds when 
they think about themselves. The value assigned to self-conceptions might in turn determine 
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their impact on people‟s emotions, thoughts, and behaviors (Pelham 1991). For example, a 
person who considers herself shy and unattractive will feel all the more anxious when meeting 
new people if she considers it important to make a good impression to others and, 
consequently, she will avoid going to big parties (Rapee and Heimberg 1997). By conferring 
degrees of value to self-conceptions, the ventral MPFC may thus play a central role in 
mediating the emotional and motivational impact of the self-concept. Disturbances of such 
valuation process may play an important role in various psychopathological states in which 
self-views impact emotions and behavior negatively, such as depression (Beck et al. 1979) 
and social anxiety disorder (Rapee and Heimberg 1997). 
While emotive investments in self-views correlated specifically with activity in a 
region of the ventral MPFC, epistemic investments were uniquely related to a more dorsal 
area of the MPFC. These two areas were also dissociable in terms of their patterns of 
responses relative to resting baseline: in line with previous findings (Gusnard et al. 2001), the 
ventral MPFC showed decreased activity relative to baseline, whereas the dorsal MPFC 
increased its activity. These findings provide support for the idea that the dorsal MPFC 
mediates cognitive rather than affective aspects of self-referential processing (Gusnard et al. 
2001; Schmitz and Johnson 2007). A recent meta-analysis (van der Meer et al. 2010) indicates 
that contrary to the ventral MPFC, the involvement of the dorsal MPFC is not unique to self-
representation, but is also apparent when thinking about others (see also Lieberman 2010). 
The dorsal MPFC might mediate general purpose cognitive processes that contribute to self-
representation, such as memory retrieval and evaluation processes (Legrand and Ruby 2009). 
People‟s degree of confidence in a particular self-view depends on the amount and 
consistency of information they have about this aspect of themselves (Pelham 1991). The 
increased activity in the dorsal MPFC that was observed in this study for more certain self-
views could therefore reflect the engagement of processes that support the retrieval, 
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evaluation, and/or integration of self-related information in order to construct coherent self-
views.  
The current findings could shed light on a number of previous observations that have 
been made regarding the neural correlates of self-representation. Although the majority of 
neuroimaging studies have found that the degree of activity in the ventral MPFC is higher 
when thinking about the self than when thinking about other persons (see the meta-analysis of 
van der Meer et al. 2010), the studies that have compared the self with close others have 
yielded more inconsistent results (Ochsner et al. 2005; Heatherton et al. 2006; D'Argembeau 
et al. 2007; Vanderwal et al. 2008). These divergent findings could, in part, stem from 
differences in the value attached to the other person. To some extent, people treat the 
resources, perspectives and identities of close others as their own, but this inclusion of the 
other in the self can be more or less pronounced (for review, see Aron et al. 2004). Whether or 
not one finds differences in ventral MPFC activity when people think about themselves versus 
another person might depend on the extent to which the other is included in (and thus valued 
as much as) the self. In a similar vein, previous studies have shown that the level of activity in 
the ventral MPFC is lower when thinking about past and future selves than when thinking 
about the present self (D'Argembeau et al. 2008; Ersner-Hershfield et al. 2009; D'Argembeau 
et al. 2010b; Mitchell et al. 2011). These findings could also be explained in terms of the 
value attributed to different self-conceptions. People tend to distance themselves from 
psychologically remote selves, such that these are devalued and, in some ways, regarded as 
other persons (Wilson and Ross 2003; Pronin and Ross 2006). The reduced activity in ventral 
MPFC when thinking about temporally distant selves could thus reflect the diminished value 
that is assigned to these self-conceptions. Our findings may also be relevant for interpreting 
previous results concerning the neural correlates of self-referential processing in major 
depression. There is evidence that depressed patients display abnormal activations in the 
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MPFC during self-referential processing (Grimm et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2009; Lemogne et 
al. 2009; Yoshimura et al. 2010), but the pattern of functional abnormalities seems to differ 
for ventral and dorsal portions of the MPFC (for review, see Lemogne et al. in press). This 
could in part be due to dissociable effects of depression on epistemic and emotive investments 
in self-views, although this awaits further investigation (see also Lemogne et al. in press, for 
other possible accounts). 
Although we focused here on the MPFC, investments in self-views were correlated 
with activity in other brain regions as well. First, activity in the PCC was positively correlated 
with both epistemic and emotive investments in self-views. The PCC has been associated with 
self-referential processing in several previous studies (e.g. Johnson et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 
2006; Moran et al. 2006; D'Argembeau et al. 2008) and has also been linked to value 
assignment (e.g. O'Doherty et al. 2003; Kable and Glimcher 2007; Schiller et al. 2009). This 
region could thus contribute to the valuation of self-views, in association with the ventral 
MPFC. Alternatively, the increased PCC activity that was detected in this study might reflect 
the retrieval and integration of autobiographical information (Svoboda et al. 2006) to support 
self-views that are valued more. Investments in self-views were also associated with increased 
activity in the inferior parietal lobe. This region is known for its role in attentional shifts to 
salient information (Corbetta and Shulman 2002), including retrieved memory contents 
(Cabeza et al. 2008). The increased activity in the inferior parietal lobe that was detected in 
this study could (tentatively) reflect an increased attention to self-conceptions on which 
people place more investments.  
We also detected increased activity in the lateral temporal cortex in relation to 
epistemic investments in self-views. This might reflect the retrieval of semantic 
autobiographical knowledge (Svoboda et al. 2006), considering that the degree of confidence 
with which a particular self-view is held depends on the amount of information people have to 
18 
 
support this aspect of themselves (Pelham 1991). Another notable finding was that emotive 
investments in self-views were associated with increased activity in the right posterior insula. 
This region is involved in representing primary interoceptive signals that provide the basis for 
the sense of the physiological condition of the body (Craig 2002). Lesion and functional 
neuroimaging studies suggest that the right posterior insula also contributes to the genesis of 
the sense of body ownership and sense of agency (Karnath and Baier 2010). For example, 
Tsakiris et al. found that activity in the right posterior insula (in the same region as the one 
detected in this study) correlated positively with the subjective feeling of owning the rubber 
hand in the rubber hand illusion paradigm (Tsakiris et al. 2007). The present results thus 
suggest the intriguing possibility that the value we attach to high-level, conceptual 
representations of ourselves is, in part, grounded in a more “primitive” bodily sense of self 
(Damasio 1999). 
Finally, it should be noted that although epistemic and emotive investments are quite 
distinct, they are nonetheless slightly positively correlated (Pelham 1991). The present study 
replicated this finding and further showed that epistemic and emotive investments influenced 
the speed of self-descriptiveness judgments in similar ways. Moreover, although each form of 
investment was associated with specific neural substrates, the two forms of investment 
overlapped to some extent, notably in a small region of the ventral MPFC and in the PCC. 
These areas thus seem to constitute “core regions” for the self-concept, responding to those 
self-views for which one is most certain and to which one attaches most importance. It is 
noteworthy that these ventral MPFC and PCC regions correspond to the “hubs” of the default 
network, a network of brain regions that is engaged during rest and low demand task 
conditions (Gusnard and Raichle 2001; Buckner et al. 2008). People experience various kinds 
of thoughts during so-called resting states (D'Argembeau et al. 2005) or when their mind 
wanders (Smallwood and Schooler 2006), and there is evidence that the default network 
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contributes to such internally generated thoughts (Buckner et al. 2008; Spreng et al. 2009; 
Stawarczyk et al. 2011). Recent findings further indicate that the default network comprises 
multiple, dissociated components and that the ventral MPFC and PCC represent a core set of 
“hubs” within this network (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). These core regions may contribute 
to a set of processes that evaluate, select, and organize mental representations on the basis of 
their personal relevance (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010; D'Argembeau et al. 2010a). The present 
results provide support for this view and further suggest that these processes are sensitive to 
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Table 1. Brain regions in which activity correlated with self-descriptiveness 
 MNI coordinates   
Brain region x y z Z-score pSVC 
Ventral MPFC -8 50 -10 5.37 < .001 
Dorsal MPFC -10 60 22 3.26 .044 
Posterior cingulate cortex -4 -52 28 5.10 < .001 
Left inferior parietal lobe -44 -74 38 4.86 < .001 
Right insula 44 -2 10 3.86 .008 
Left caudate -10 14 8 4.20 .002 
Note: MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex. Ventral MPFC refers to z coordinate ≤ 10 mm and 
dorsal MPFC to z coordinate > 10 mm. pSVC = p-value corrected for multiple comparisons at 




Table 2. Brain regions in which activity correlated with the certainty and the importance of 
self-views 
 MNI coordinates   
Brain region x y z Z-score pSVC 
Certainty      
   Dorsal MPFC -6 54 22 4.63 < .001 
   Ventral MPFC -6 54 0 4.51 .001 
   Posterior cingulate cortex 0 -54 34 3.40 .027 
   Left inferior parietal lobe -50 -62 38 4.99 < .001 
   Right inferior parietal lobe 50 -56 44 3.62 .014 
   Left middle temporal gyrus -56 -16 -16 4.05 .003 
   Right middle temporal gyrus 64 -16 -14 3.53 .018 
      
Importance      
   Ventral MPFC 4 52 -6 4.36 .001 
   Dorsal MPFC 8 44 26 3.60 .015 
   Posterior cingulate 
cortex/precuneus 
-2 -66 32 3.98 .004 
   Left inferior parietal lobe -48 -64 40 5.30 < .001 
   Right inferior parietal lobe 54 -50 34 3.69 .011 
   Right insula 40 -12 6 3.65 .013 
Note: MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex. Ventral MPFC refers to z coordinate ≤ 10 mm and 
dorsal MPFC to z coordinate > 10 mm. pSVC = p-value corrected for multiple comparisons at 




Table 3. Brain regions that were specifically related to either the certainty or importance of 
self-views 
 MNI coordinates   
Brain region x y z Z-score pSVC 
Regions specifically related to certainty (certainty exclusively masked by importance) 
   Dorsal MPFC -6 54 22 4.63 < .001 
   Left middle temporal gyrus -56 -16 -16 4.05 .003 
      
Regions specifically related to importance (importance exclusively masked by certainty) 
   Ventral MPFC 6 48 -6 4.05 .003 
   Right insula 40 -12 6 3.65 .013 
   Right inferior parietal lobe 52 -52 34 3.57 .016 
Note: MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex. Ventral MPFC refers to z coordinate ≤ 10 mm and 
dorsal MPFC to z coordinate > 10 mm. pSVC = p-value corrected for multiple comparisons at 







Figure 1. Response times for the self-descriptiveness judgments as a function of degrees of 
self-descriptiveness (left panel), certainty in self-views (middle panel), and importance of 
self-views (right panel). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 2. Brain regions in which neural activity was positively correlated with ratings of self-
descriptiveness. Displayed at p < .001 (uncorrected) on the mean structural MRI of all 
participants. The right panel shows the signal change in the peak voxel in the ventral MPFC. 
 
Figure 3. Brain regions that responded to epistemic and emotive investments in self-views. 
The brain areas in which activity was correlated with the certainty of self-views (epistemic 
investments) are displayed in blue, whereas the brain areas in which activity was correlated 
with the importance of self-views (emotive investments) are displayed in red; the overlap 
between the two activation maps is shown in purple. Displayed at p < .001 (uncorrected) on 
the mean structural MRI of all participants. 
 
Figure 4. Medial prefrontal areas that were specifically related to epistemic and emotive 
investments in self-views (exclusive masking analyses). (A) A region of the ventral MPFC 
responded specifically to the importance of self-views (emotive investments). As can be seen 
from the right panel, the signal change in this area took the form of deactivations relative to 
resting baseline. (B) The dorsal MPFC responded specifically to the certainty of self-views 
(epistemic investments). This area showed signal increases relative to baseline (right panel). 
The maps are displayed at p < .001 (uncorrected) on the mean structural MRI of all 
participants.
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